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REFLECTIONS ON SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
ROBERT W. HAMILTON*
I have a somewhat different perspective on the issues of successor lia-
bility than appears in any of the admirable Articles in this Symposium. I
was first involved in business acquisitions in the late 1950s and early
1960s when I was practicing in Washington, D.C. before going into
teaching. At that time, the concept of manufacturers' strict liability for
product defects was virtually unknown' and the principles governing
successor liability for obligations of the selling corporation were thought
to be well understood. It was universally acknowledged that successor
liability existed in whole or in part in connection with sales of stock and
with statutory mergers. In sale of asset transactions, however, successor
liability could be based only on express or implied consent. It was a
simpler world, in short, and a useful starting point for considering the
problems discussed in this Symposium.
Even without any concern about modem products liability law, it was
my experience that most 1950s-era transactions were structured as a sale
of assets at the insistence of the buyer, particularly in the sale of closely
held businesses.2 The basic problem in successor liability then, as it is
* Minerva House Drysdale Regents Chair in Law University of Texas School of Law. The
principle advantage of writing a commentary over writing an article is that one may present impres-
sionistic analyses of problems without footnote citations and without always giving due credit for
ideas that originate with others. This brief Commentary does just that.
1. Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, which addresses strict liability for product de-
fects, was adopted in 1965.
2. The prototype case I am addressing is the sale of a closely-held manufacturing business that
has been in operation for many years. The selling shareholders are disposing of their business which
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now, was concern about undisclosed or future-arising liabilities, particu-
larly liabilities that were either contingent or completely unknown and
unpredictable. Examples of such liabilities include tax liabilities arising
from future audits of pre-acquisition years, potential government con-
tract renegotiation liabilities, future contractual or breach of warranty
claims based upon pre-acquisition transactions, and future tort claims
based upon pre-acquisition incidents. Concerns about such liabilities
were entirely legitimate-nothing could be quite as embarrassing as hav-
ing a newly purchased business be found liable for income tax deficien-
cies incurred in a year prior to the purchase-and an asset transaction
was the most foolproof way of handling those concerns.3
Because the parties structured the transaction as a sale of assets, it
usually required the selling corporation to take two discrete steps. First,
the selling corporation sold its assets in bulk to the purchaser (or to an
entity created by the purchaser for the purpose of owning and operating
the business being acquired).' Second, shortly thereafter the selling cor-
they have operated and managed for many years and which the purchaser will thereafter own and
operate, often through a subsidiary. Usually, the parties contemplated that the business would con-
tinue to manufacture essentially the same products under the same trade names, operate under the
same or a very similar corporate name, utilize the same work force at the same plant, and continue
the same distribution system for its products. Often the selling shareholders agreed to continue the
management of the business for a limited period of time, and they might also retain an equity interest
in the purchasing business. The purchaser likely instituted any changes in the method of operation
gradually and in fact continued to follow current methods for an extended period after the transac-
tion. This description is virtually a laundry list of what should not be done today in order to mini-
mize the risk of successor liability. In the absence of liability, I suspect the same patterns would be
very common today.
3. From an economic standpoint, parties may obtain exactly the same result by a sale of stock,
a sale of assets, a statutory merger, a triangular merger, a reverse triangular merger, a statutory
share exchange or by a combination of forms. Statutory mergers result in the acquiring entity be-
coming directly or indirectly responsible for contingent or future-arising liabilities. Generally, pur-
chasers are unwilling to acquire businesses subject to these liabilities without some assurance of their
magnitude and without some protection if the actual liabilities exceed the assured amount. Sellers
might provide assurance through a formal representation or by a commitment to indemnify the
purchaser against such liabilities. Enforcement of such commitments might create problems if the
proceeds of the sale are dissipated. While it is possible to escrow a portion of the purchase price to
assure satisfaction of those representations or commitments, it is always possible that the undisclosed
or future-arising liabilities might exceed the escrow or might arise after the escrow expired. A
straight purchase of stock or a triangular transaction in which the business is merged with a subsidi-
ary of the acquiring corporation also does not provide complete protection, because the value of the
acquired corporation or subsidiary may be reduced if it is compelled to discharge undisclosed or
future-arising liabilities. As indicated in the text, it is uncomfortable for a purchaser of a business to
discover that that business has undisclosed or future-arising liabilities relating to periods before the
acquisition of the business that it must discharge.
4. The sale typically involved the sale of all business assets needed for the operation of the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss2/2
REFLECTIONS ON SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
poration would dissolve, distributing the proceeds of the sale-whether
cash or securities of the purchaser-to its shareholders after paying or
making provisions for its liabilities.5
In such transactions, liabilities of the selling business were apportioned
between the purchaser and the seller. The purchaser usually assumed
routine business liabilities. These liabilities included: (1) all liabilities
reflected on the books of the corporation on a specified date (together
with liabilities entered into in the ordinary course of business since that
date); and (2) expressly listed significant contingent or future liabilities
and obligations that were not reflected on the books. The expressly listed
liabilities included major contracts, long term leases, pension plans, rou-
tine pending litigation, and the like. The contract then set forth a rou-
tine, almost boiler plate, contractual provision stating expressly that the
purchaser assumed no other or additional liabilities of the selling
corporation.
Because any substantial business is almost always involved in litigation
of one kind or another, the purchaser in fact usually assumed responsibil-
ity for some pending litigation. Most of this litigation involved claims of
a determinable maximum amount or claims covered by insurance that
appeared to protect the business against the maximum potential expo-
sure. Where the list of significant contracts and pending litigation that
the seller was asking the purchaser to assume revealed substantial expo-
sure, the typical result was further negotiation between the parties. This
negotiation usually lead to a mutually acceptable compromise: (a) an
appropriate reduction in the purchase price; (b) an indemnification agree-
ment by which the seller agreed to pay the amount by which the ultimate
cost of the litigation exceeded the current estimate6 (possibly an escrow
business, including accounts receivable, cash in banks, and inventory. In other words, the parties set
a global price for the business and its assets. Unrelated businesses operated by the seller and assets
that were not essential for the conduct of the business, such as funds invested in securities, unrelated
businesses, and the like might be excluded, but these assets were usually spun off to the shareholders
(or to a new entity created by the shareholders) in advance of the sale of the business assets to the
purchaser.
In some instances the parties might defer or readjust all or part of the purchase price based on the
future profitability of the business being sold-in other words, a workout.
5. The subsequent dissolution of the selling corporation was not essential. If it retained unre-
lated businesses, it may have continued in existence as an active business under a different name.
Even if its sole asset consisted of cash (the proceeds of the sale) it might remain in existence as a
personal holding company. Nevertheless, in most cases the selling corporation promptly dissolved in
order for the selling shareholders to obtain the proceeds of the sale.
6. Where the pending litigation appeared to have merit and was uncertain as to amount, the
1989]
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of a portion of the purchase price to ensure that funds would be available
to meet these indemnification obligations); or (c) a change in the agree-
ment specifically excluding the liability in question from those being as-
sumed by the purchaser. In practice, the purchaser expressly did not
assume a fair amount of potential or unknown liabilities and exposure to
known liabilities. The selling corporation or its shareholders had to deal
with these liabilities in connection with the contemplated subsequent dis-
solution and distribution of the sales proceeds.
Usually the decision to exclude specific miscellaneous liabilities, litiga-
tion, and unknown potential liabilities or claims from the assumption
clause of the agreement did not harm present or future creditors of the
selling corporation. The selling corporation remained liable on those ob-
ligations. Third persons with claims then in litigation or with accrued
claims potentially the subject of litigation against the selling corporation
were generally not made worse off by the sale of the business. They
merely had recourse to the proceeds of the sale, rather than the operating
assets of the business, in order to satisfy their claims. Further, the con-
templated dissolution did not affect them adversely for two reasons: first,
corporate dissolution statutes required that corporations satisfy claims or
make adequate provision for their satisfaction as a condition to dissolu-
tion,7 and second, state corporation statutes contained a provision con-
tinuing the existence of a dissolved corporation for a specified period
following dissolution (usually two years), and authorizing the filing of
suits against dissolved corporations within that period.8 Even potential
creditors with contingent or unaccrued, claims were, as a practical mat-
ter, probably not placed in an adverse position by the dissolution because
their claims would normally surface and be brought within the survival
period following dissolution. Hence, issues of transferee liability of the
type discussed in this Symposium were unlikely to arise because a rem-
edy was usually available against the selling corporation with respect to
claims that the purchaser did not expressly assume.9
purchaser usually declined to assume responsibility for the litigation. The seller then had the respon-
sibility of settling the litigation or allowing it to continue with the possible consequence of delay in
the contemplated dissolution and distribution of the sales proceeds to shareholders. Similarly, the
seller sometimes reluctantly agreed to retain responsibility for litigation it believed to be groundless
with a similar consequence.
7. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 80 (1960).
8. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 98 (1960).
9. See generally Friedlander & Lannie, Post Dissolution Liabilities of Shareholders and Direc-
tors for Claims Against Dissolved Corporations, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1363 (1978).
[Vol. 67:325
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An obvious question that one should ask is why the problems that
exist today cannot be handled in precisely the same way as analogous
problems were handled thirty years ago. Clearly some new types of lia-
bilities discussed in this Symposium-particularly strict liability in tort
for defective products sold many years or decades earlier°--create
problems for such a solution. These liabilities normally do not surface
until long after the sale of assets transaction has been completed, long
after the dissolution of the selling corporation, long after the distribution
of the proceeds to shareholders, and long after the expiration of the post-
dissolution period during which suits may be brought against the dis-
solved corporation. 1 Thus, present corporation statutes may bar any
claim against the dissolved corporation or the shareholders who received
the liquidating distributions before the plaintiff's injury even occurred.
Not surprisingly, therefore, injured plaintiffs in this situation bring suit
against the purchaser even in the teeth of the purchaser's contractual
protection-protection based on purchase of only assets and express
nonassumption of liabilities of the type asserted. Not only is the succes-
sor the deepest pocket around; it is, quite likely, the only pocket around.
When a court faces the reality that a plaintiff who has suffered injuries,
possibly horribly disfiguring, painful, and permanently disabling injuries,
has no defendant to sue, it is not surprising that it develops theories
about "de facto merger, .... continuity of enterprises," or "product lines."
The arguments and justifications that courts have made in support of
these doctrines are logically unpersuasive. The true explanation for them
is natural solicitude for plaintiffs. That the defendant never assumed lia-
bility and was in no way involved in the manufacture or sale of the prod-
uct that caused the injury becomes less significant to many courts when
10. The labor law obligations discussed by Mr. DuRoss in his Article in this Symposium appear
to me to be in a somewhat different category. Even though the obligations imposed upon buyers
"are incalculable at the time of ownership transfer" their existence with regard to the current work
force is clearly known. In contrast, products liability and environmental clean-up claims may never
arise or be asserted; they are contingent claims in the classic meaning of the word contingent. The
fact that the "unpredictable and confusing criteria adopted to determine successorship renders illu-
sory any accurate prediction of which liabilities and obligations will be imposed" of course does
make the rules with respect to obligations in the labor area analogous with the rules relating to
successor liability for products liability claims.
11. It is not clear that suits may be brought on post dissolution claims for liabilities that arise
during this period. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 198i), held that this
provision allowed claimants to pursue only claims arising prior to dissolution and that a claim aris-
ing out of an accident that occurred following dissolution was not covered. Id. at 549-50. The Texas
statute on which this decision was based was amended in 1987.
1989]
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the alternative is denying all recovery to a seriously injured plaintiff.12
The present law of successor liability seems to me to give us the worst
of all possible worlds. First, as amply demonstrated by the Articles in
this Symposium, purchasers may structure transactions to avoid succes-
sor liability entirely. The advance sheets regularly contain cases in which
a successor corporation avoided liability by judicious use of some of the
techniques discussed in this Symposium. The doctrines therefore do not
fully achieve the goal of providing some protection for injured plaintiffs.
Further, however deserving the plaintiff is in light of the serious injuries
he or she received, it appears unfair to impose that liability on a defend-
ant who assumed no contractual responsibility for the transaction, was
not involved in it, and did not profit from it.13
In addition, the present rules governing transferee liability have less
obvious deficiencies that skew business transactions. Given the present
uncertainties of the theories described in these Articles, a purchaser can-
not know, on an ex ante basis, whether and when it will be subjected to
transferee liability. A court decides whether to impose liability only after
litigation over details of the specific transaction and the specific accident.
Such open-ended and imprecise rules undoubtedly encourage litigation.
This uncertainty creates two further undesirable effects: (1) it probably
causes purchasers to make arbitrary and unreliable estimates of future
liability and reduce the prices they are willing to pay for businesses even
though claims may never arise, and (2) it encourages purchasers to make
liability-minimizing changes in the acquired business methods of opera-
tions and product lines even though those changes may not be desirable
from a purely economic standpoint. Thus, a purchaser may close down a
plant, fire a work force, or rename or redesign a product not to improve
efficiency but to break the continuity of the enterprise and the product
line and thus minimize the risk of successor liability. Very sensible prac-
tices such as having an overlap of managers and having the selling share-
12. By these comments I do not mean to criticize the judges who have evolved the doctrines of
successor liability. The result of no recovery in some of these situations is arguably unacceptable in a
civilized society. My point is only that the arguments made by the courts in finding successor liabil-
ity are make-weights or rationalizations to avoid denying all recovery to an injured plaintiff because
of a sale transaction in which the injured plaintiff did not participate and of which he or she was in
all probability unaware.
13. Because, by hypothesis, the injury occurred after the sale of assets the cost of the injury
could not have been taken into account in the negotiation of the purchase price. It may be that as
the reality of successor liability has taken hold, purchasers have reduced prices because of the risk of
such liability. That, however, is an arbitrary and inaccurate way to allocate costs.
[Vol. 67:325
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holders retain an equity interest in the purchasing enterprise significantly
increase the risk of successor liability. The practice of dissolving the sell-
ing corporation promptly, which the selling shareholders usually desire
so that they may obtain the benefits of the sales proceeds, may be resisted
by the purchaser because it increases the likelihood of successor liability
at some future time. Thus, selling corporations may remain in existence
or the purchaser may require that the seller retain and continue to oper-
ate some fragment of the former business not because it is sensible to do
so but because that increases the protection from successor liability of the
purchasing corporation. The liability rules discussed in this Symposium
are, in short, affecting conduct in a potentially undesirable way.14
The best solution to the current concern over successor liability is to
devise better systems by which claimants may recover late-arising liabili-
ties from the selling shareholders. An effective system of placing losses on
the sellers could abolish, or a least greatly curtail successor liability. Cer-
tainly, if the parties knew of an injury caused by a product defect at the
time of the sale negotiations, its cost would have been shifted back to the
selling shareholders in some way and not assumed by the purchaser.
Why not adopt legal rules that impose the cost of unknowable and un-
predictable litigation on the parties who would have born the cost had
there been negotiation based on complete knowledge about future events?
Unfortunately, the problem is more difficult than first appears. A sim-
ple rule that shareholders who receive liquidating distributions must
thereafter respond to future product liability claims would mean that
shareholders could never dissolve a corporation and distribute its assets
on a basis that assures them that they may keep the proceeds. Such a
rule creates serious unfairness for shareholders. Perhaps the most obvi-
ous example of unfairness involves the relatively small shareholder with
modest means who did not participate in management of the enterprise
before it was sold. When that shareholder receives a substantial distribu-
14. One possible argument for successor liability is that it compels the purchasing corporation
to adopt negotiating strategies to shift the risk back to the selling corporation. In Turner v. Bitumi-
nous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406,428, 244 N.W.2d 873, 883 (1976), the court suggested that succes-
sor corporations might protect themselves from the liability imposed in that case in the form of
"products liability insurance, indemnification agreements or of escrow accounts, or even a deduction
from the purchase price." While this seems theoretically plausible, it has not worked in practice,
primarily because of the uncertainty of the legal principles that have evolved. Rather than seeking to
develop devices to shift the risk back to sellers, purchasers appear to seek to develop devices that
avoid the imposition of liability entirely. Further, given the random nature of products liability
litigation in many industries, the suggestion of indemnification probably can never be very successful
on a systematic basis.
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tion in liquidation, a significant possibility exists that he will use this
"windfall" for some personal benefit or extravagance he would not con-
sider in the absence of the windfall. If the shareholder must return a
portion of the distribution unexpectedly at some future time, he may jus-
tifiably feel that he was worse off as a result of the distribution.15 A
definite advantage exists in having a time when transactions are finally
closed and recipients of funds may use them without fear that they may
be snatched back at some future time.
A more serious problem is the practical difficulties that are created by
a rule that shareholders must continually satisfy liabilities as they occur.
It would require the difficult, if not impossible task of tracing numerous
payments made many years earlier. If the funds are successfully traced,
difficult questions arise. What should be done, for example, about gifts
made to family members? Are the donees to be liable? One could imag-
ine an extremely expensive and arbitrary system for determining who
must return funds. Even under the simplest of rules, where the corpora-
tion makes liquidating distributions to a large number of shareholders
who are scattered around the country, collection will be difficult. As a
practical matter, in these scenarios the larger shareholders likely would
bear all the cost of such liabilities merely because of the prohibitive cost
of bringing suit against large numbers of small defendants.
One might suggest other, less fanciful, solutions. A statute might re-
quire a dissolving corporation to escrow a portion of the sales proceeds
for an indefinite period for the protection of future tort claimants, but
exempt shareholders who receive liquidating distributions in excess of
the escrow from liability to future claimants.16 Problems with such a
proposal seem equally insurmountable. How is the amount determined?
How are the rights of distant future claimants protected as against the
claimant who has already brought a claim and exhausted the fund? Who
is to protect and litigate on behalf of the fund? What happens ultimately
to the unused portion of the fund? Does it escheat to the state?
Another suggestion proposed by some courts and academic commen-
tators requires that corporations proposing to dissolve following a sale of
assets must provide and pay for a reasonable amount of insurance against
15. I am not suggesting that the cost and unhappiness this rule would cause such a shareholder
equals the cost and unhappiness of serious and permanent injury to an innocent plaintiff. I am
merely pointing out that the rule suggested in the text also has costs.
16. See Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products
Liability Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 17 (1986).
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future products liability claims that may arise from products they have
previously placed in commerce. While products liability insurance is
available in many industries, it is usually of the type known as "claims
made" insurance. This insurance provides protection only against claims
made during the period the insurance is in effect. At the present time,
dissolving corporations generally cannot obtain insurance covering liabil-
ities arising from all transactions in the past that may produce claims any
time in the indefinite future. Perhaps such "tail" insurance protecting
against all future liabilities arising from a discrete number of past events
might be economically feasible to write, and may become available in the
future. If so, such insurance might provide considerable protection.
This type of insurance, however, is generally unavailable at the present
time. 7
The problem of after-arising products liability claims in dissolution
proceedings was considered at some length in the discussions that led to
the development of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act. The
drafters adopted an interim or preliminary solution."8 Basically, the so-
lution extends the post-dissolution period during which claiments may
bring their claims to five years after the dissolution. The Act also makes
it crystal clear that "a claimant whose claim is contingent or based on an
event occurring after the effective date of dissolution" is entitled to take
advantage of the provision.19 Further, claims under this section may, if
the assets have been distributed in dissolution, be enforced
against a shareholder of the dissolved corporation to the extent of his pro
rata share of the claim or the corporation assets distributed to him in liqui-
dation, whichever is less, but a shareholder's total liability for all claims
under this section may not exceed the total amount of assets distributed to
him.20
The official comment states that the purpose of this clause is to ensure
that claimants seeking to recover distributions from shareholders "will
try to recover from the entire class of shareholders rather than concen-
trating only on the larger shareholder and [thus the provision] protects
the limited liability of shareholders." The official comment also recog-
17. Other solutions may also suggest themselves. For example, one might imagine a "work-
men's compensation" type fund to which all dissolving corporations contribute. This fund might
then be available for persons injured after the dissolution by products manufactured by the dissolv-
ing corporations.
18. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 14.06, 14.07 (1984).
19. Id. § 14.07(c)(3).
20 Id. § 14.07(d)(2).
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nizes that a five-year limitation on claims is to some extent arbitrary, but
states that "it is believed that the great bulk of post dissolution claims
will arise during this period."
The Revised Model Act does not attempt to limit claims against suc-
cessor corporations based on the theories described in this Symposium.
That was viewed as an inappropriate subject for a state corporation stat-
ute.21 Rather, the official comment to section 14.07 merely states:
In some circumstances a tort law concept of transferee liability, some-
times characterized as "de facto merger," has been applied to allow plain-
tiffs incurring post dissolution injuries to bring suit against the person that
acquired the corporate assets .... Some courts have refused to apply this
doctrine, particularly when the purchaser of the corporate assets has not
continued the business of the dissolved corporation. In these cases the rem-
edy of the plaintiff is limited to claims against the dissolved corporation and
its shareholders receiving assets pursuant to the dissolution.
The solution adopted in section 14.07 ... is believed to be a reasonable
compromise between the competing considerations of providing a remedy
to injured plaintiffs and providing a period of repose after which dissolved
corporations may distribute remaining assets free of all claims and share-
holders may receive them secure in the knowledge that they may not be
reclaimed.22
The solution proposed by the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
is clearly only a first attempt at rationalizing this unsatisfactory area of
the law. It does, however, deserve a legitimate trial because it places the
cost of litigation on the parties that should be called upon to bear that
cost.
21. The RMBCA, however, does suggest that the application of the de facto merger doctrine is
inappropriate to provide appraisal rights in sale of asset transactions. See REv. MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT § 11.01 official comment 2 (1984).
22. Id. § 14.07 official comment 2, 3.
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